









Dad jokes, D.A.D. jokes, and the GHoST  







The ability of a computer to have a sense of humor, that is, to generate 
authentically funny jokes, has been taken by some theorists to be a 
sufficient condition for artificial consciousness. Creativity, the 
argument goes, is indicative of consciousness and the ability to be 
funny indicates creativity. While this line fails to offer a legitimate test 
for artificial consciousness, it does point in a possibly correct direction. 
There is a relation between consciousness and humor, but it relies on a 
different sense of “sense of humor,” that is, it requires the getting of 
jokes, not the generating of jokes. The question, then, becomes how to 
tell when an artificial system enjoys a joke. We propose a mechanism, 
the GHoST test, which may be useful for such a task and can begin to 
establish whether a system possesses artificial consciousness. 
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Donald Mitchie (1993) argues that we need to recast the traditional distinction between 
the easy and hard problems of consciousness when considering artificial intelligence and 
instead think in terms of “the problem of artificial intelligence” and “the problem of artificial 
consciousness.” The former, he argues, requires a successful Turing test; while the latter, he 
contends, demands something different, what he terms a successful “Searle test.” 
 
In other words, we can think of the question of artificial intelligence as being 
comprised of four different questions: 
 
(1a) Can a constructed artificial system be intelligent? 
(1b) What test would separate the intelligent from non-intelligent constructed 
systems? (2a) Can a constructed artificial system be conscious? 
(2b) What test would separate the conscious from the unconscious constructed 
systems? 
 
Questions 1a and 2a belong to the computer scientists, whereas questions 1b and 2b 
belong to the philosophers. The questions 1b and 2b ask how we define the terms, where we 
draw the line, and how can we operationalize it. Questions 1a and 2a are challenges to develop 
systems that cross the line or theoretical arguments providing reasons to believe the line can 
never be crossed. Indeed, the answers to 1b and 2b in no way presume that the test may ever 
be passed. Even if one could show, as some argue, that machine consciousness is impossible, 
the claim that the answer that 2a is “necessarily no” presumes that there is an answer to 2b 
(an in-principle Searle test, in Mitchie’s terminology) which we can demonstrate that no 
computer could ever successfully complete. To contend that 2a is a priori false requires 
accounting for the necessary existence of a gap between the upper limit of technological 
systems and what would be required by a hypothetical system that could pass the proper 
Searle test. 
Today, with machine learning as an established subfield of computer science, we can 
be assured that question 1a, the problem of artificial intelligence, has been answered in the 
affirmative. This is not to say that there is not interesting philosophical work still to be done 
around question 1b. The line has surely been crossed, but the questions “where exactly was 
the line” and “why put it there?” remain interesting. 
Mitchie refers to an answer to 1b as a “Turing test,” but that is in the general sense of 
that ambiguous term. Whatever the correct answer to 1b turns out to be, it will remain an 
issue for Turing scholars to assess how Alan Turing’s various versions of the imitation 
game, and the assorted extensions of it, turn out to relate to that line. The questions 2a and 
2b, on the other hand, both remain tantalizingly open. To 2a, we have to answer “no.” But 
it is unclear whether by “no” we should mean “not yet” (the empiricist position) or “not 
possible” (the a priori position). To 





distinguish between these, we would need to assess the possibility that one could in principle 
construct a system that would pass Mitchie’s Searle test. But that claim requires having the 
proper Searle test, in other words, the answer to 2a presupposes an answer to 2b. 
There are two approaches to 2b, that is, two very different visions of what a successful 
Searle test would look like. On the one hand, there are the “behaviorists” who argue that a 
successful Searle test would be of the same sort as the successful Turing test, only include 
more intricate criteria. On this view, one can infer consciousness from something like an 
imitation game only including, say, output that requires some capacity beyond learning, e.g., 
creativity. On the other hand, there are the “structuralists,” like Pentti Haikonen who 
contend that if machine consciousness is possible, tests for it would have to be concerned 
with internal structure of the system and not inferred from output of it. We can infer nothing 
from the results, only from a similarity of structure. 
 
A lot, therefore, hangs on the formulation of a successful Searle test. We explore a novel 
approach, the GHoST test, which does not offer a complete answer to 2b, but does allow us 
to establish the intellectual neighborhood in which the successful Searle test would have to 
reside, through something akin to the intermediate value theorem, that is, we will be able to 
see how passing the GHoST test in one sense is insufficient for consciousness and how 
passing it in a different way would be clearly sufficient. Hence, the proper Searle test, 
whatever it turns out to be, will have to draw the proper line somewhere in between. 
The GHoST test is a behaviorist test, which differs in important ways from the standard 
approach (and which will require an additional structural element). A strand of the 
behaviorist research program to develop the proper Searle test focuses on computer 
creativity, with a sub- strand devoted to computer humor creation – to be truly funny, they 
contend, requires consciousness. We argue that this approach provides too weak a criterion 
to act as a proper Searle test. Instead of looking for a system capable of generating laughs in 
humans, we should instead look for a system capable of creating digital auto-didactic, or 
D.A.D. jokes, that is computer- generated dad jokes. The emergence of D.A.D. jokes, jokes 
known not to be funny but told anyway, may, in fact, constitute evidence for machine 
consciousness. We contend that this approach at least succeeds in avoiding the standard 




2. Empiricist and a priori arguments concerning 
machine consciousness and the need for a Searle test 
Not only is the question concerning computer consciousness open, but the question as 
to whether it is even a question remains open. Some, like Douglas Hofstadter contend that 
it is an 





empirical question. We can conceive of systems, at least hypothetically, that would, pass 
any successful Searle test, so it is a possibility. On the other hand, there are those like Louis 
Marinoff who argue that given any reasonable definition of consciousness, any machine will 
necessarily fall short. 
 
The classical argument against computer consciousness comes from Ada Lovelace. 
“The Analytical Engine has no pretentions to originate anything. It can do whatever we 
know how to order it to perform (Quoted in Turing, 1950, 450 – italics in the original).” A 
necessary condition for consciousness, Lovelace contends, is creativity. Hofstadter, who 
wrote his (2009) essay “Essay in the Style of Douglas Hofstadter” in the style of Douglas 
Hofstadter, argues that the ruling out of the meaningfulness of a creativity-based Searle test 
on a priori grounds is illegitimate. He considers David Cope’s EMI which produces novel 
compositions in the style of human composers whose work is entered in as input. Hofstadter 
then posits a hypothetical, maximally successful version of the system which created new 
pieces of music such that the best-trained experts could not differentiate from pieces by great 
composers, say, Bach or Mozart. He then further imagines an analogous system which 
would be similarly successful in the development of scientific results. We can imagine a 
machine capable of writing papers with new discoveries in physics whose creative and 
mathematical approach is so much in the style of Albert Einstein that even physicists and 
Einstein scholars could not tell if it was Einstein or the machine who produced it. 
 
Using this thought-experiment, Hofstadter proposes a reductio ad absurdum argument 
designed to bolster the intuition that the limit case of a creativity-based Searle test should 
be considered a successful answer to the Lovelace objection. If we had the Einstein imposter 
of a computer, then surely this version of the imitation game would be successful in meeting 
Lovelace’s concern. This type of creativity is so impressive that anything capable of it surely 
must have a mind. Using discoveries in physics of the level and in the style of Albert Einstein 
as a limiting case, Hofstadter concludes that it is at least in principle possible – extrapolating 
from technology we have today – to envision a machine we would be forced to conclude 
has sufficient creativity that demands we accept it as conscious. By positing such discoveries, 
we can now imagine possible creative output from a machine that, if it were to be observed, 
would surely satisfy even the most hardened Lovelacian critic. 
On the other hand, there are those like Marinoff who argue that such imaginings are 
irrelevant fantasies. Machines are machines and we have provable theorems concerning 
computability and those produce upper-limits that will always and necessarily fall on short-
side of the line constructed by any successful Searle test. 
 
When it comes to performing quantitative tasks in competition with humans 
including playing games such as checkers and backgammon, or even chess and Go, 
the computer is no longer the underdog, but the overdog; not yet and perhaps never 
to be a Nietzschean übermensch in evolutionary terms, but demonstrably an 
überhund at parlour games (74). 







Computers may have abilities that we consider cognitive and may be superior to humans 
in the rate and accuracy of such computational procedures, but there is a necessary 
difference between the organic and constructed mind that necessarily keeps computers on 
the weak side of the Searle test. 
 
I submit that a–perhaps the–salient difference between computer versus human 
performance lies not merely in what they can and cannot do, but rather in how they 
attempt to do what they can and cannot do. In methodological terms, the computer 
is an entity that strictly follows instructions, while the human is a being that 
constitutionally disregards them. Computers do exactly and only what they have 
been instructed to do, whereas humans are capable of an inexactitude that includes, 
but is not restricted to the self- prompted or unconscious misinterpretation, omission, 
permutation, and modification of members of a given instruction set (ibid.) 
 
There is, in this quotation, a vague appeal to an intuitive Searle test which, Marinoff 
argues, will necessarily be failed by any computer no matter how powerful the hardware 
and subtle and clever the software. 
 
He considers two competing arguments based upon Church’s theorem. The first is the 
empiricist argument which he frames as: 
1. All and only intuitively computable functions are Turing computable 
(Church’s theorem). 
2. Understanding and meaning are intuitively computable functions we just 
haven’t figured out how to compute them yet. (Empiricist belief) 
Therefore, understanding and meaning are Turing computable. (Strong AI) 
 
Contrast this with the a priori argument: 
1. All and only intuitively computable functions are Turing computable 
(Church’s theorem). 
3. Understanding and meaning cannot be intuitively computable functions. (a 
priori belief) 
Therefore, understanding and meaning are not Turing computable. (Denial of strong AI) 
 
We do not have a proof of Church’s theorem, but as both views depend upon it equally, 
let us assume it. The question is whether we have good reason to believe 2. or 3., and 
Marinoff argues that “we have reason for supposing the understanding and meaning are not 
intuitively computable,” what he terms the “reverse Turing test, furnishes one such reason 
(76).” 





Suppose that a human (H1) is given a set of instructions (S1) which, if faithfully 
executed, would result in the imitation of a Turing machine (T1). But suppose that 
the human makes meaningful mistakes in their execution. Now, we ask whether we 
can build another Turing machine, T2, such that T2 can make meaningful mistakes 
(ibid.). 
 
The answer must be yes or no. If no, then no strong AI. If yes, then T2 must have been 
given a set of instructions S2 which it faithfully executed, thereby not truly having committed 
meaningful mistakes, but rather have made no mistake in imitating humans who make 
meaningful mistakes. He has revived the Lovelace objection. 
 
Two points need to be taken away from this. First, both Hofstadter and Marinoff 
presuppose, a line but do not establish a Searle test telling us where it is. Hofstadter gives 
us a thought experiment whose conclusion is presumed to have passed any reasonable line, 
where Marinoff gives us an argument that presumes that any mere instruction executing 
system must not have crossed any reasonable line. For either of these arguments to be 
complete, the line needs to be established. Second, while the two disagree on whether 
crossing the line is possible, they both provide an interesting insight that may allow us to 
think more clearly about where the line is. Marinoff focuses on human’s proclivity for 
making meaningful mistakes. Hofstadter has made a similar claim, that we will know that 
we have artificial consciousness when we find humans and computers making the same sort 
of mistakes. They may both be correct that the missing element in the conversation, the 
successful Searle test could be something related to a reverse Turing test. 
 
 
3. Possible forms of a Searle test 
 
There are two different approaches to testing for artificial consciousness, behaviorist 
and structuralist. The behaviorist tests are those that draw the line based on the output of a 
system. Such tests are appropriate for Turing tests (in Mitchie’s sense) because, unlike in 
the case of consciousness, intelligence does not fall prey to the Lovelace objection. To act 
intelligently is to be intelligent. If, for example, we were to take learning as a sufficient 
condition for intelligence, one cannot imitate learning without learning. In this way, 
intelligence is like singing. The only way to imitate singing is to sing. As such, the question 
is which sorts of cognitive behavior are the correct ones with which to draw the line and do 
we have examples of artificial systems engaging in it. 
But consciousness is a completely different matter. Where intelligence is a behaviorist 
notion and thereby open to behaviorist testing; consciousness seems to require something 
not directly observable, something within the system. One could create an object that imitates 
being conscious without being conscious, examples are plentiful from Eliza and Siri to 
Weekend at Bernie’s and Munch’s Make-Believe Band at Chuck E. Cheese. 







Behaviorists argue that the problem of consciousness with respect to artificial systems 
is no different than the problem of other minds with regard to seemingly fellow humans. 
Going back at least as far as René Descartes, the inverse problem of consciousness has been 
asked: how do I know that the people I believe to be conscious are not just automata? We 
were at that time, of course, restricted in this matter to behavioral data. B. Jack Copeland 
(2003) points out that Descartes’ protégé Géraud de Cordemoy, in his book A Philosophical 
Discourse Concerning Speech, used the Cartesian insight to anticipate Turing’s imitation 
game: 
 
To speak is not to repeat the same words, which have struck the ear, but to utter 
others to their purpose and suitable to them. …[N]one of the bodies that make echoes 
do think, thought I hear them repeat my words...I should by the same reason judge 
that parrots do not think neither….But not to examine any further, how it is with 
parrots, and so many other bodies, whose figure is very different from mine, I shall 
continue the inquiry...I think I may...establish for a Principle that...if I find by all 
experiments I am capable to make, that they use speech as I do,...I have infallible 
reason to believe that they have a soul as I do (quoted in Copland, 10). 
 
At this time, the concept of mind and soul were considered identical, so de Corduroy 
has produced a principle which he deemed sufficient for determining if something has a 
mind: “If a non-human thing has the capacity to use speech as humans do, a condition 
subject to experiment, then that thing possesses a mind.” When they make unpredicted 
conversational contributions that make sense to us and are human-like in their content, then 
we have reason to infer that we are interacting with a second, distinct intelligence. 
 
The behaviorists contend that if this test is good enough for the opacity of the human 
mind (for those other than yourself), then it should be good enough for the general case. Of 
course, the behavior could not merely be conversational imitation, but would need to be 
something much more cognitively intricate to give sufficient evidence of consciousness. A 
standard criterion for the extended de Courtemoy approach to a Searle test involves 
computer creativity. Truly creative output, they argue, requires a mind and so if we can find 
the right sort of creative endeavor, we could formulate a creativity-based behaviorist Searle 
Test. 
This is what Hofstadter is arguing in (2009). If a computer could produce multiple papers 
with legitimate scientific discoveries based on reasoning that experts could not tell from that 
of Albert Einstein, then this version of the imitation game would be successful in meeting 
the critics’ concern. Discoveries in physics of the level and in the style of Albert Einstein 
are a limiting case. By positing such discoveries, we can now imagine possible creative 
output from a machine that, if it were to be observed, would surely satisfy even the most 
hardened Lovelacian critic. 





Others have trod Hofstadter’s behaviorist path by returning to Cope’s musical approach, 
but the type of musical output in the hope that we would not need a limiting case at the level 
of Einsteinian physics to undermine the apriority of the Lovelace objection. Antonio Chella 
and Riccardo Manzotti (2012) contend that we do not need breakthroughs in physics, a 
sufficient demonstration of computer creativity would be found in a computer that could be 
an integral part of a jazz ensemble. It is one thing, as Cope’s EMI system does, to compose 
scores, but to successfully improvise musically with a band, that is, to interact in real time 
with humans who are swinging and contribute artistically in a fashion that would be non-
differentiable from a human musician, that should be enough to satisfy the critics and count 
as computer creativity. 
Still others have changed the artistic medium altogether. As Turing sets out, critics 
contend that among the things a machine could never do is, “Be kind, resourceful, beautiful, 
friendly, have initiative, have a sense of humor, tell right from wrong, make mistakes, fall 
in love, enjoy strawberries and cream, make someone fall in love with it, learn from 
experience, use words properly, be the subject of its own thought, have as much diversity 
of behavior as a man, do something really new (1950, 447).” The one that seems most 
tractable is “have a sense of humor.” Researchers including Huma Shah and Kevin Warwick 
(2017), Graeme Ritchie (2015), and Margaret Boden (2009) have therefore been focusing 
on using humor generation as the creativity- basis for an empirical undermining of the 
Lovelace objection. If we can create a computer with a sense of humor, then that sort of 
creativity should lead us to posit consciousness. 
Ritchie (2009) notes that the operative phrase “sense of humor” is itself not rigorously 
defined and as such determining when a computer can be said to have a sense of humor is 
thus also underdetermined. To use this property in an argument for strong AI, it needs to be 
rigorously testable. While the notion may be vague, intuitively it seems satisfied by a person 
who generates original humorous utterances that others find funny. As such, if computers 
can create new humor that is genuinely funny, then we may have an empirical justification 
that undermines the Lovelace objection. 
How close are we? Shah and Warwick (2017) review a number of recent attempts. Their 
conclusion is that some of the best computer-generated humorous utterances are somewhat 
amusing. In other words, we certainly do not have the empirical evidence that would be 
needed to counter the claim of Lovelace critics, but what they argue we may have is 
supporting evidence that the research program is moving in a positive direction. In other 
words, we have some evidence that someday we might have the evidence we need to 
conclude a positive creativity-based behaviorist Searle test. 
Those who take the Lovelace objection to be conclusive contend that no behaviorist test 
will ever be a successful Searle test. Because consciousness requires internal qualities of an 
individual (e.g., internal monologue, sense of self, volition) and because these are always 
opaque, it is always possible to imitate them with truly possessing them. The only system 
that we know for sure possesses it is the human brain. From a physiological system 
comprised of mere atoms, consciousness arises as an emergent property. As such, the line 
goes, the only possible way to be 





assured that artificial consciousness exists would be to have a system that intricately and 
accurately models the structure of the human brain. 
On this view, the only sort of test that is possible would be structural. Neuroscientists 
work on their end to develop the “neural correlates of consciousness,” that is, the minimal set 
of interrelated structural elements in the brain that allow consciousness to emerge (Crick 
and Koch 1990). Computer scientists then work to build an isomorphic artificial neural 
network. If we know what the minimal structure is for a mind to emerge, then we have our 
lower limit on what we need to model, go and do it. 
 
A different version of the structuralist approach is the “cognitive approach” taken by 
Pennti Haikonen who argues that the isomorphism does not have to map component onto 
component, but rather function onto function. 
 
Conscious robot cognition calls for information integration and sensorimotor 
integration and these lead to the requirement of an architecture, the assembly of 
cross-connected perception/response and motor modules (Haikonen 2012, 4). 
 
Haikonen’s argument is that what gives rise to consciousness is to be found in the 
functional modalities of the mind. If we can construct components that do what the parts of 
the brain do, and have them do them interactively the way an organic human brain does, that 
should be sufficient to give rise to the emergent property of consciousness even if we cannot 
map neurons onto artificial neurons. In this way, he has developed a computerized cognitive 
system with internal monologue, which seems prima facie to be a property of conscious 
entities. Haikonen sees this achievement as a step in the right direction, but insufficient. 
 
How about machine consciousness? Self-consciousness is not yet emulated here, as 
the simulation system does not have episodic memory for personal history nor body 
reference for self-concept ("I") and therefore is not able to perceive itself as the 
executing agent. Even though the system has the flow of inner speech and inner 
imagery and it operates with them, it is not yet able to report having them. It is not 
able to produce much towards the response "I have inner imagery" or the 
consequence "I think – therefore I exist". Obviously, this kind of a report would only 
count as a proof of self-consciousness if it can be seen that the system is producing 
it meaningfully, i.e. the system would have to be able to perceive its inner imagery 
as such and it would have to possess the concepts like "I", "to have" and "inner 
imagery". The mere reproduction of preprogrammed strings like "I have inner 
imagery" would not count as a proof here (Haikonen 2000, 8). 
 
Internal monologue may be necessary, but is not sufficient for consciousness. 





However, Haikonen does point out an issue with both the behaviorist and structuralist 
approaches to a Searle test – neither seems sufficient in and of themself. If one has a system 
that appears to pass a behaviorist Searle test, one always has to worry about the Lovelace 
objection, that is, was the machine simply programmed to produce that seeming sign of 
consciousness. Is it a mere imitation? Similarly, with a structuralist Searle test, just because 
you have a system that structurally resembles an organic system in which consciousness 
emerges, do you, in fact, have consciousness? It seems that any system that passes a 
structural Searle test would still have to demonstrate its consciousness in some behavioral 




4. The GHoST Test 
 
Those who try to use humor generation as a behaviorist Searle test contend that the 
creativity necessary to create truly funny jokes should be seen as an answer to the Lovelace 
objection, that is, the ability to repeatedly construct novel comic utterances that are 
genuinely funny is to have a sense of humor. Only conscious beings can have a sense of 
humor. Therefore, this works as a Searle test. 
 
The problem, of course, is that it does not answer the Lovelace objection. It certainly 
seems conceivable that one could create an algorithm that would analyze a category of joke, 
identify those properties that funnier jokes share, and use that to form new versions. 
Consider the old chestnut, “I saw a man in the park with a telescope.” Humans are quick to 
see one ambiguity in this sentence, that you spied a man carrying a telescope versus that you 
spied the man through a telescope. Artificial semantic evaluation differs from human 
analysis in just as quickly picking up on the peculiar interpretation whereby you used the 
telescope to saw the man in half. Human consciousness is thereby a hindrance to finding 
certain linguistic interpretations which artificial means may find easily due to the lack of 
influence of certain sorts of psychological priming. 
It does not seem absurd that such ambiguities might be used by a computer-based joke 
generator as the basis for pun-based jokes which, because of the learned effective joke 
structure, would be as funny as those of a human with a developed sense of humor, but because 
of the human’s disinclination to see these particular ambiguities would thereby be novel 
jokes. So, we would have a generator of funny new jokes, but because it is all done 
algorithmically, we surely do not have confidence of the system’s consciousness as a result. 
Having a sense of humor, thereby, does not seem to be a legitimate Searle test. 
But the notion of a “sense of humor” is ambiguous. Indeed, Martin and Ford (2018) 
distinguished between three notions of that phrase. When we say someone has a sense of 
humor we could mean (1) that the person possesses an active faculty of humor appreciation, 
that is, that




they like a good joke, (2) that the person is skilled at humor delivery, that is, they are the 
life of the party and know how to keep a crowd laughing, or (3) that the person has an active 
faculty of humor production, that is, that the person is a generator of novel comic acts. These 
are three very different properties, yet in common parlance all of them are described by 
having a “sense of humor.” 
The one that is relevant to a possible Searle test is not the first, ability to create jokes, 
but rather the third, the ability to get jokes. We all have jokes that we are thoroughly 
embarrassed to find funny. We know these jokes are poorly constructed, morally 
problematic, juvenile, or just plain stupid; yet, we cannot stop ourselves from snickering at 
them in spite of ourselves. It is that experience of finding the funny that is the real mark of 
intelligence, whether or not we are capable of creating the funny or bringing the funny. What 
we are looking for with the Searle test, in essence, is Gilbert Ryle’s “ghost in the machine,” 
but we are looking in the wrong place with computer joke generators because while we 
might be able to make the machine crank out jokes, it would only be the ghost that would 
find them funny. 
 
Unfortunately, we run into the Lovelace objection. We could certainly design a system 
that recognizes jokes and that learns what jokes humans tend to enjoy in jokes and then 
which mimics human laughter at an appropriate level: a guffaw for successful slapstick, a 
haughty chuckle at a clever witticism, and a disapproving eyebrow raise for a tight pun. 
This, again, would be mere imitation that would never satisfy the Lovelace critic – nor should 
it. We need a different approach for a comedic hunting of the ghost. 
That different approach will pull together insights from several disparate sources and 
bring them together in a proposal for a new sort of test. The first insight came from Douglas 
Hofstadter (and is echoed in Marinoff). When our institution was fortunate to host Hofstadter 
for a visit a few years back, he responded to a question about artificial intelligence with a 
statement to the effect that we will know we have strong artificial intelligence, not when we 
see computers doing the sorts of things we can do, but when we see them making the sorts 
of mistakes we make. Humans and computers both make mistakes, he pointed out, but they 
make radically different sorts of mistakes. The output when there is a bug in a program looks 
nothing like the sorts of cognitive mix-ups we see in humans. 
 
Consider the catalogue of error-types that Hostadter and David Moser (1989) collected. 
These include categories like malapropisms: “I like a magazine with good, objectionable 
reporting,” spoonerisms: “tea and flick spray,” infelicitous metaphors: “Welcome to Israel, 
a Mecca for tourists,” and metaphors: “That was a breath of relief.” They have a range of 
categories and loads of examples. Part of what makes these instances of human error amusing 
is that we recognize them in our own experience. They are, indeed, human. The brain works 
in a specific way and is prone to certain sorts of mistakes based upon that wiring. 





As such, we can learn about the wiring through the sorts of errors to which it is prone. 
Computers are wired differently and so they make different sorts of errors, errors that we 
tend not to see in people. When we can construct machines that make errors more similar to 
ours, Hofstadter’s line went during his response at the talk, then we will have machines with 
wiring more like ours and that is when we can lay claim to having developed artificial 
consciousness. 
 
The GHoST test will appropriate the insight that we need to examine computer failings 
instead of successes for signs of intelligence, but change the sort of errors examined. 
Hofstadter’s interest is in cognitive-linguistic miscues. We will argue that deeper 
ramifications are to be found in a quite different sort of mistake. The clue for that is to be 
found back in Turing (1950). In his consideration of “the argument from informality of 
behavior,” he discusses the lack of rule- boundedness that we find in lived human choice-
making. 
 
One might for instance have a rule that one is to stop when one sees a red traffic 
light, and go when one sees a green one, but what if by some fault both appear 
together? One may perhaps decide that it is safest to stop. But some further difficulty 
down the road may well arise from this decision later (Turing 1950, 452). 
 
Turing’s point is that the number of potential situations in which one may find oneself 
is potentially unlimited and so we would potentially require an unlimited number of 
behavioral rules. But we cannot know a potentially unlimited number of rules, meaning that 
human behavior is not rule-bound. 
Perhaps this is true, perhaps it is not. The particular objection is not our concern. Rather, 
it is this shift from cognitive processing to social behavioral rules that is important for this 
matter and Turing’s invocation of them provides the spark. But while all human behaviors 
may not be rule- based, human conversational behaviors may be. This is the well-known 
view championed by H.P. Grice (1975). Conversation is a cooperative endeavor and as such 
requires rules to function properly. Grice sets out four maxims: Maxim of Quantity: “Make 
your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange),” 
Maxim of Quality: “Try to make your contribution one that is true,” Maxim of relation, “Be 
relevant,” and Maxim of Manner: “Be perspicuous.” To be a responsible conversant, one 
should follow the rules as obeying the maxims will allow the conversation to be maximally 
successful and efficient. 
However, these rules are sometimes broken in the course of conversation. When 
someone observes such an infelicity on the part of their co-conversant, there is a decision to 
be made. One could consider one’s conversational partner to have violated the Cooperative 
Principle because the person is uncaring, uncouth, or insufficiently well-versed in proper 
conversation. But, one might reject this belief and consider one’s co-conversant to be fully 
dedicated to the cooperative conversational project. If this were true, such an infelicity 
would be sure to be noticed as an 





unexpected act. Perhaps the rule was violated as some sort of signal that the conversational 
context is about to change radically and this requires a change of behavior on both of our 
parts. Perhaps, the colleague whose affairs we had been discussing is coming to join the 
conversation necessitating a rapid change in topic. The violation of a conversational maxim 
may be an error that has a cooperative function. To discern the goal of the intentional error 
and thereby understand the intent of the speaker requires an inference, a conversational 
implicature, on the part of the listener. 
So, from Hofstadter, we take the insight that errors may be more informative than 
successes. From Turing, we get the shift from cognitive-linguistic blunders to behavioral 
ones. From Grice, we take the notion that there may be inferences to be made from willful, 
intentional violations of cooperative conversational rules. What is left is an appropriate rule 
for comic conversation. For this, we turn to Peter Singer. Despite nearly two and a half 
centuries of devastating counter-examples to the principle of utility utilizing examples 
ranging from slavery to infanticide to bestiality, Singer continues to doggedly maintain 
complete devotion to it. One cannot but respect such fidelity. We can use it to formulate a 
Gricean sort of maxim for comic conversation that demands the maximization of comic 
utility, “only tell jokes that you have good reason to believe your audience will find 
amusing.” Joke only so that you maximize overall utility. 
The advantage of this sort of rule is that it can be built into a machine learning algorithm 
for a computer. If we design a computerized joke creation program, we can have people rate 
the output in such a fashion that the program will learn what people do and do not find funny. 
In this way there should be an observable learning curve according to which the machine 
gets progressively funnier. We should see a stable upward trend in the funniness of the 
computer’s output. This is not to say that there will not be misses. There will certainly be 
instances that are below the trend line as there will be those which form the sorts of advances 
from which the machine will learn. 
Putting together the insights from Grice, Hofstadter, Singer, and Turing, we can 
construct the GHoST test wherein willful violation of a utilitarian principle concerning 
humor in conversation will provide us with legitimate warrant for an inference of true 
machine intelligence. We can show that this test suffices to attribute intelligence to humans 
and will, thus, be useful in assessing a specific set of possible artificial products. 
 
5. Dad jokes, bad jokes, D.A.D. jokes and B.A.D. jokes 
 
Humans are capable of violating behavioral rules. We do it all the time...some of us more 
than others. The stereotypical middle class American father is widely known to violate the 
Singer-Grice comedic maxim. Corny, clean, often pun-based jokes that the father knows will 
not be enjoyed by their children (particularly if teenagers and especially in the company of 
their friends) are known in colloquial terms as “dad jokes.” Dads fully know the reception 
that their jokes will receive, and 





yet tell them anyway. This is a clear violation of the generally accepted rule to only tell 
jokes that will maximize overall utility, but that does not stop Pop. Why do dads tell these 
unappreciated dad jokes? Because they want to. Because they find the charming little jokes 
funny. It is a selfish, albeit harmless, expression of volition. Dad is amusing himself. Dad 
jokes are bad jokes, but dad doesn’t care. 
 
Dad is a biological entity (no matter what mom sometimes says). In telling jokes that he 
knows others will not enjoy, but which amuse him, he is acting autodidactically. Bad jokes 
told by organic, living beings are “biological autodidactic” jokes, or B.A.D. jokes. Dad jokes 
are not only bad jokes, they are also B.A.D. jokes. B.A.D. jokes being intentional acts that 
violate a behavior rule are following de Courdemoy’s condition, evidence that dad is 
intelligent (again, no matter what mom sometimes says). It is a specific sort of verbal act 
that requires not only an active sense of humor (in the first sense) but also volition. Dad 
jokes combine two elements that seem individually indicative of intelligence. Combined, 
they surely are even more so. 
 
If a computer created a joke that it knew was below the standard of humor appreciated 
by humans, but which it decided to tell anyway, we would have an example of a digital 
autodidactic joke, or D.A.D. joke. D.A.D. jokes, like dad jokes, are bad jokes; but D.A.D. 
jokes, unlike dad jokes, are not B.A.D. jokes. 
If we can use dad jokes in combination with an extended de Cordemoy condition to 
infer intelligence in dad, then the same ought to hold for D.A.D. jokes and their non-organic 
originator. If a computer acts autodidactically, then it acts with a will and only thinking 
things have a will. If that artificial mind possesses the desire to tell a joke it knows the 
audience will not enjoy, then we have reason to believe that it was told because the program 
itself though it was funny. This would be evidence that we are dealing with something with 
a sense of humor (in the first sense). D.A.D. jokes would be evidence in favor of artificial 
consciousness. 
How then do we know when we have a D.A.D. joke? We can establish a lower bound 
employing a joke-generator that we know does not pass the structural element of a Searle 
test for consciousness (the sort discussed in Shah and Warwick 2017), but is capable of 
learning based upon human reactions to the jokes it constructs. In this way, there should be 
a positive curve with the jokes becoming funnier over time, although certainly there ought 
to be expected clunkers in the bunch. 
Syntactic and semantic evaluation of successful jokes would produce generalized joke 
structures which would create templates for further new jokes. One would have to expect “I 
saw the man in the park with the telescope” sorts of instances wherein the novel generated 
joke conforms to the structure according to which it ought to be a joke that humans find 
funny, but which, because of our cognitive make-up, humans tend not to find funny. For 
example, suppose a system developed such a template for successful jokes and used it to 
iteratively create a joke “fractal,” that is, a joke in which embedded versions of the joke 
structure, taken together form an 





example of the structure itself. Such a joke might be capable of analysis that renders it 
technically successful, but beyond the capacity of the human mind to process sufficiency to 
garner a reaction. Or perhaps, a system could develop a combination of templates, again 
whose complexity undermines its comedic success despite being consistent with the a 
posteriori results working as the foundational input into the system. The presentation of such 
instances would be an example of intelligence without consciousness, yet an expectation of 
jokes being funnier than they are. 
 
In other words, we would expect the artificial joke generator to “think” that these jokes 
are funnier than they, in fact, are. Because the system, by supposition, does not pass the 
structural side of the Searle test, we know that the computer, despite having good reason to 
“believe” the joke is funny does not find the joke funny. This is thereby the lower bound on 
the behavioral side of the Searle test. 
Suppose, on the other hand, for the sake of argument, that we have a system that does 
satisfy the structural element of a Searle test. Now, we are looking for a behavior that 
indicates the sort of cognitive properties one associates with consciousness, the “I think, 
therefore I am” moment. If such a system included the same sort of joke generator that we 
posit in the prior example, then, again, we ought to expect a learning curve, with a positive 
humorousness trajectory with the occasional clunker. Clunkers would not be indications of 
D.A.D. jokes since we would also see them in the prior case. 
What one would need to see is repeated generation of a related set of similar jokes that 
conform to the rules of quality joke generation, but are of the “I saw the man in the park with 
the telescope” variety. The joke generator would have learned through syntactic and 
semantic evaluation how to create jokes. Through the response to the jokes, it would have 
learned that there is a gap between successful jokes of the format and “I saw the man in the 
park with the telescope” examples, that is, there is a gap between what ought to be funny 
and what is funny. To continue to explore the “ought” line and not surrender it to the “is” 
line, despite negative conditioning, would be the digital equivalent of making dad jokes, that 
is, they would be D.A.D. jokes. The distinction in semantic processing should, on the 
condition that we do hypothetically have an instance of artificial consciousness, give rise to 
a different sense of humor in the first sense. The system would believe that jokes humans do 
not fund funny, are, in fact, funny. It would find them funny and believe that we have the 
defective sense of humor. Humans are cognitively limited, just not smart enough, to 
understand how funny these jokes, in fact, are. 
The claim is not that there is or ever will be such a system. Again, what we are looking 
for here are the conditions for a Searle test. One can hold the a priori position that there 
could never be artificial consciousness, but in doing so one still requires a successful Searle 
test to say that computers could never get to that line. The second case is an upper limit on 
the behavioral element of such a test. In other words, if there was a system that passed some 
successful version of the structural element of a Searle test, the passing of the GHoST test 
as described above would then 





give us reason to think we have artificial consciousness. The result then, is not that we have 
sketched a successful Searle test, but that with the GHoST test, we now have a lower and 
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